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JANICE M. V. MARGARET K.: ELIMINATING SAME-SEX PARENTS’
RIGHTS TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN BY
ELIMINATING THE DE FACTO
PARENT DOCTRINE
EMILY R. LIPPS*
In Janice M. v. Margaret K.,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether de facto parent2 status was a recognized legal sta-
tus in Maryland and, if so, whether de facto parents could seek cus-
tody or visitation of a child over the objections of legal parents based
solely on a determination of the child’s best interests.3  The court held
that, given legal parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to the care,
custody, and control of their children, de facto parenthood is not a
recognized status in Maryland.4  Thus, the court concluded that a de
facto parent, like any third party, must meet a heightened standard
for obtaining custody or visitation rights—either that the legal parent
is unfit or that exceptional circumstances warrant such custody or visi-
tation.5  In so holding, the court failed to recognize that the test for
establishing de facto parent status adequately protects legal parents’
rights, thus making additional safeguards for those rights unneces-
sary.6  The court further failed to distinguish de facto parents from
other third parties and thus incorrectly relied on cases applying the
heightened standard in third party custody and visitation disputes.7
Had the court recognized that a lesser standard is appropriate for es-
tablishing a de facto parent’s child visitation rights over the objections
of the child’s legal parent, it could have better recognized modern
Copyright  2009 by Emily R. Lipps.
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1. 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008).
2. The term “de facto parent” means “parent in fact,” and describes “a party who
claims custody or visitation rights based upon the party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-
biological, non-adopted child.” Id. at 680–81, 948 A.2d at 84.
3. Id. at 664, 680, 948 A.2d at 74, 84.
4. Id. at 664, 671, 948 A.2d at 74–75, 79.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
691
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notions of family and more adequately protected same-sex couples’
parental rights without undermining the constitutional right of legal
parents to the care, custody, and control of their children.8  Finally,
granting de facto parents the same rights as legal parents in visitation
disputes is consistent with the laws of several other states and is espe-
cially important given the court’s veiled implication that the Maryland
legislature may not itself have the constitutional authority to protect
de facto parents.9
I. THE CASE
In 1986, Janice M. and Margaret K. met and began a committed
same-sex relationship.10  For the next eighteen years, the two women
lived together in Janice’s home,11 but never married.12  During their
relationship, Janice often expressed to Margaret a desire to have chil-
dren.13  In 1999, after Janice was unable to become pregnant by in
vitro fertilization, she adopted Maya, a child from India.14  Margaret
neither formally participated in the adoption process nor attempted
to adopt Maya in Maryland.15
Maya arrived in the United States in December 1999, and lived
with Janice and Margaret in the couple’s home until they separated in
the summer of 2004.16  During that time, Janice and Margaret shared
the responsibilities of caring for Maya, including feeding her, chang-
ing her diapers, bathing her, and managing her schooling and health-
care needs.17  Margaret bought Maya’s food and toys and gave Janice
money to purchase Maya’s other necessities.18  According to Margaret,
both Janice and Maya consistently referred to Margaret as Maya’s
mother.19
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.D.
10. Janice M., 404 Md. at 665, 948 A.2d at 75.
11. Id.
12. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md. App. 528, 530, 910 A.2d 1145, 1147 (2006).
13. Janice M., 404 Md. at 665, 948 A.2d at 75.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 665 & n.2, 948 A.2d at 75 & n.2.  The record in this case suggests that Mar-
garet’s failure to formally participate in Maya’s adoption in India may be, in part, the result
of Indian adoption regulations that prohibit adoption by same-sex parents. Id. at 665 n.2,
948 A.2d at 75 n.2.
16. Id. at 665–66, 948 A.2d at 75–76.
17. Id. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76. Margaret regularly picked up Maya from daycare, at-
tended her field trips, choir practices, horseback riding lessons and competitions, family
vacations, and other social functions. Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 531, 910 A.2d at 1147.
18. Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 531, 910 A.2d at 1147.
19. Id. at 532–33, 910 A.2d at 1148.  In her Emergency Motion for Visitation, Margaret
asserted that various cards and letters, including Mother’s Day cards, referred to Margaret
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After Janice and Margaret separated, Margaret visited Maya, un-
supervised, three to four times per week.20  But as the relationship
between Janice and Margaret deteriorated, Janice began restricting
Margaret’s visits with Maya and, in October 2004, Janice sent Margaret
a letter specifying the conditions under which Margaret could visit
Maya.21  Margaret’s unsupervised visits with Maya were subsequently
reduced to approximately two per week.22  In January 2005, after Mar-
garet became dissatisfied with Janice’s restrictions, Margaret’s attorney
wrote Janice regarding Margaret’s visitation rights.23  In response,
Janice denied Margaret all visitation with and access to Maya.24
In February 2005, Margaret filed a complaint in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County, alleging that she was entitled to custody of or,
in the alternative, visitation with Maya.25  The circuit court found that,
as Maya’s adoptive parent, Janice was entitled to a presumptive right
of custody.26  Accordingly, the circuit court granted Janice’s motion
for judgment as to custody, finding no evidence of Janice’s lack of
fitness and no extraordinary, exceptional, or compelling circum-
stances that would require the court to remove Maya from Janice’s
custody.27  As to visitation, the trial court held that because Margaret
met the four factors establishing her status as Maya’s de facto parent,
the propriety of visitation depended only on Maya’s best interests.28
The court granted Margaret visitation rights, reasoning that under the
as Maya’s “mother” and thanked Margaret for “‘taking on such a load of responsibility for
Maya’” and for the “‘emotional, physical and financial support’” that Margaret gave to
Janice and Maya. Id.
20. Janice M., 404 Md. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76.
21. Id.  The conditions in Janice’s letter required Margaret to arrange visitation
through Janice rather than with Maya directly, to take Maya only to places Janice approved,
to not speak disparagingly about Janice, and to inform Janice of any individuals accompa-




25. Id. at 666–67, 948 A.2d at 76; Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md. App. 528, 530, 910
A.2d 1145, 1147 (2006).  In April 2005, Margaret filed an Emergency Motion for Visitation.
Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 532, 910 A.2d at 1148.
26. Janice M., 404 Md. at 667, 948 A.2d at 76.
27. Id. at 667–68, 948 A.2d at 76–77.
28. Id. at 668–69, 948 A.2d at 77 (listing the four factors the circuit court considered in
determining Margaret’s de facto parent status as: (1) whether the legal parent consented
to and fostered the relationship between the third party and the child; (2) whether the
third party lived with the child; (3) whether the third party performed parental functions
for the child to a significant degree; and (4) whether a parent-child bond was forged).
Although the circuit court, and later the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Ap-
peals, relied on these factors in determining whether Margaret was Maya’s de facto parent,
the Court of Appeals also cited the American Law Institute’s definition of de facto parent
as:
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best interests standard, it would be detrimental to Maya to cut off her
relationship with Margaret.29
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,
holding that the circuit court correctly found no evidence to rebut the
presumption that Janice was entitled to custody of Maya.30  The Court
of Special Appeals also found that, as to visitation, the trial court was
correct in concluding that Margaret was Maya’s de facto parent and,
as such, was entitled to visitation based on the best interests stan-
dard.31  The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether de
facto parents seeking visitation rights must first show parental unfit-
ness or exceptional circumstances before the court can apply the best
interests of the child standard.32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized the
right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.33  The Court has further held that the
constitutional right of parents to the custody of their children rests on
a presumption that parents act in their children’s best interests.34  Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied a heightened
standard to a third party’s claim for custody of a child over the objec-
tions of the child’s legal parent.35  The Court of Appeals later deter-
mined that the same standard applied to third parties’ claims for
visitation.36  Like the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which held
[A]n individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a signif-
icant period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for
reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a
legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete fail-
ure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly
performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly
performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent
with whom the child primarily lived.
Id. at 681, 948 A.2d at 84–85 (quoting AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
29. Id. at 669, 948 A.2d at 77.
30. Id.; Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 542–43, 910 A.2d at 1154.
31. Janice M., 404 Md. at 669–70, 948 A.2d at 77–78; Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 540, 910
A.2d at 1152.
32. Janice M., 404 Md. at 680, 948 A.2d at 84.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.B.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR305.txt unknown Seq: 5 21-APR-09 11:09
2009] JANICE M. V. MARGARET K. 695
that de facto parents did not need to meet the same heightened stan-
dard as pure third parties in visitation disputes,37 courts in several
other states have held de facto parents to be in parity with legal par-
ents for the purpose of determining visitation and have thus generally
recognized the more lenient best interests of the child standard.38
A. The Supreme Court Has Recognized the Fundamental Right of
Parents to the Care, Custody, and Control of Their Children
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”39  The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
against government interference with certain fundamental rights, in-
cluding parents’ interest “in the care, custody, and control of their
children.”40  In Meyer v. Nebraska,41 for example, the Court declared
unconstitutional a Nebraska statute prohibiting schools from teaching
any subject in a language other than English, or teaching languages
other than English below eighth grade.42  The Court reasoned that
the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed individuals the right to raise
their children and that the statute “attempted materially to interfere”
with the constitutional right of parents to control the education of
their children.43
Two years later, in 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,44 the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of an Oregon federal court enjoining en-
forcement of an Oregon statute that made it a misdemeanor for a
parent, guardian, or other person having control or custody of a child
between the ages of eight and sixteen to fail to send the child to pub-
lic school in the district where the child lived.45  The Court deter-
mined that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it
37. See infra Part II.C.
38. See infra Part II.D.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (recognizing parental interests “in
the care, custody, and control of their children [as] perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court”).
41. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
42. Id. at 397, 399–400, 402–03.
43. Id. at 399, 401.
44. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45. Id. at 530, 533–34, 536.  The appellees in Pierce were two private schools—a catholic
school and a military academy—that argued that enforcement of the Oregon Compulsory
Education Act would cause their business and property to suffer “irreparable injury.” Id. at
531–33.
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interfered with the constitutional right of legal parents “to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.”46
In 1944, the Supreme Court again recognized parents’ right to
the care, custody, and control of their children under the Fourteenth
Amendment in Prince v. Massachusetts.47  This time, however, the
Court also held that parents’ rights were subject to some limitations.48
In Prince, Sarah Prince appealed her conviction for violating Massa-
chusetts’s child labor laws by permitting her two sons and a niece, of
whom she was the legal custodian, to help her sell and distribute relig-
ious literature in the streets of Brockton.49  Prince argued that she
rightfully exercised her freedom of religion under the First Amend-
ment and her right to parent under the Fourteenth Amendment.50  In
balancing these freedoms against the state’s interest in protecting chil-
dren from the “crippling effects of child employment” and from
harms related to the “influences of the street,” the Court found that
neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood were beyond limi-
tation.51  Accordingly, the Court affirmed Prince’s conviction, con-
cluding that, under these facts, the state properly exercised its
constitutional power to limit the fundamental right of parents to pro-
tect the health and welfare of their children.52
Nearly sixty years later, in Troxel v. Granville,53 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a Washington statue that permitted
any third party to petition for visitation of a child at any time and that
authorized state courts to grant third party visitation when the court
46. Id. at 534–35.
47. 321 U.S. 158, 164, 166 (1944).
48. Id. at 166.
49. Id. at 159, 161–62.  Section 69 of Massachusetts’s child labor statute prohibited boys
under twelve and girls under eighteen from “‘sell[ing], expos[ing] or offer[ing] for sale
any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any descrip-
tion, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any street or
public place.’” Id. at 160–61 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 461, § 69 (1939)).  Section 80
provided that anyone who furnished or sold any article to a minor with knowledge or
written notice from an enforcement officer that the minor intended to sell the article, or
who knowingly encouraged a minor to violate the provisions of the child labor laws, could
be punished by a fine of $10 to $200, by imprisonment for no more than two months, or
both. Id. at 161 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 461, § 80 (1939)).  Finally, § 81 provided
that parents, guardians, or custodians who compelled or permitted a minor under their
control to work in violation of any provision of the child labor laws could be punished for a
first offense by a fine of $2 to $10, imprisonment for no more than five days, or both. Id.
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 461, § 81 (1939)).
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id. at 165–66, 168.
52. Id. at 170–71.
53. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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determined that such visitation was in the best interests of the child.54
In Troxel, Mr. and Mrs. Troxel, paternal grandparents, petitioned for
visitation with their grandchildren over the objection of the children’s
biological mother.55  Although the Troxels initially saw their
grandchildren on a regular basis, the children’s mother limited the
Troxels’ visits to one per month after the children’s biological father
committed suicide.56  The Troxels, however, sought two weekends of
overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation each
summer.57
Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor first reaffirmed that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children and
prevents state interference with those rights.58  Justice O’Connor also
recognized the traditional “presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children.”59  Because Washington’s visitation statute
allowed any third party seeking visitation to subject parents’ decisions
that visitation was not in their children’s best interests to court review,
Justice O’Connor concluded that the statute was “breathtakingly
broad.”60  And, because the statute authorized the court to determine
visitation based solely on the judge’s own opinion as to what consti-
tuted the best interests of the child, the statute failed to recognize the
presumption.61  Justice O’Connor and the plurality thus concluded
that because neither the statute nor the Washington Superior Court
limited the type of persons who could petition for visitation or the
54. Id. at 60–61, 63.
55. Id. at 60.  The Troxels filed their petition for visitation in the Washington Superior
Court for Skagit County under §§ 26.09.240 and 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of
Washington. Id. at 61.  Section 26.10.160(3) was the only statute at issue in the case and
provided that “‘[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time includ-
ing, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any
person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has
been any change of circumstances.’” Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)
(1994)).
56. Id. at 60–61.  The children’s biological mother and father were never married. Id.
at 60.  After the couple ended their relationship in 1991, the children’s father lived with
his parents and regularly brought his children home for the weekend. Id.  He committed
suicide two years later. Id.
57. Id. at 61.
58. Id. at 65–66.
59. Id. at 68 (explaining that parents have the right and duty to raise their children
based on a presumption that parents are able to make important life decisions for their
children and that the “‘natural bonds of affection’” lead parents to act in their children’s
best interests (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979))).
60. Id. at 67.
61. Id. at 67–69.
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circumstances in which the court could grant such a petition, the stat-
ute was unconstitutional as applied.62
B. Maryland Courts Have Applied a Heightened Standard for Granting
a Third Party Custody or Visitation of a Child Based on the
Constitutional Right of Parents to Raise Their Children
Like the Supreme Court, courts in Maryland have also recognized
legal parents’ natural, common law, and statutory right to the care,
custody, and control of their children in custody and visitation dis-
putes, based on the presumption that parents will act in the best inter-
ests of their children.63  Thus, when third parties seek custody or
visitation of children, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has imposed a
prima facie rebuttable presumption that the children’s best interests
are promoted in the care and custody of their legal parents, rather
than in the custody of others.64
The Court of Appeals of Maryland applied this heightened stan-
dard to a custody dispute in Ross v. Hoffman.65 In Hoffman, the court
62. Id. at 72–73.
63. See, e.g., S.F. v. M.D., 132 Md. App. 99, 109, 751 A.2d 9, 14 (2000) (noting that “the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Maryland Court of Appeals have recognized
that a natural parent has a fundamental right regarding the care and custody of his or her
child”); infra notes 65–104 and accompanying text. R
64. E.g., Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 177–78, 372 A.2d 582, 586–87 (1977) (explain-
ing that the Court of Appeals of Maryland has “consistently applied” such a prima facie
rebuttable presumption); see infra notes 65–104 and accompanying text. R
65. 280 Md. at 178–79, 372 A.2d at 587. Hoffman was the first case to collect the factors
for determining the presence of exceptional circumstances from earlier Maryland Court of
Appeals cases.  McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 419, 869 A.2d 751, 809 (2005).
However, the Court of Appeals recognized the test for third party custody of a child before
Hoffman in several cases. See McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 441, 174 A.2d 66, 69 (1961)
(citing the test for third party custody as articulated in Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86
A.2d 463, 468 (1952)); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 420, 140 A.2d 660, 661 (1958)
(“Both sides agree that ordinarily either parent is entitled to custody of a child in prefer-
ence to any third person, but that this rule is subject to the qualification that such custody
will be denied if (a) the parent is unfit to have custody, or (b) if there are such exceptional
circumstances as make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child.”); Ross,
199 Md. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468 (finding that parents’ rights to the custody of their children
“may be forfeited where it appears that any parent is unfit to have custody of a child, or
where some exceptional circumstances render such custody detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the child”); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 117, 43 A.2d 186, 192 (1945) (not-
ing that § 1 of Article 72A of the Maryland Code of 1939 provided that “[t]he provisions of
this Article shall not be deemed to affect the existing law relative to the appointment of a
third person as guardian of the person of the minor where the parents are unsuitable, or
the child’s interests would be adversely affected by remaining under the natural guardian-
ship of its parent or parents” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Piotrowski v. State, 179
Md. 377, 381, 18 A.2d 199, 200–01 (1941) (explaining that “courts are bound . . . to recog-
nize the natural right of parents to the custody of their children, and unless convinced that
it would be injurious to their welfare, to maintain the relationship”); see also Hoffman, 280
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considered whether Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman, a couple who raised and
supported a child as their own for eight years on behalf of the child’s
biological mother, Ms. Ross, were entitled to custody over the objec-
tions of Ms. Ross, who sought to reclaim custody of her child.66  The
court first established that the best interests of the child standard con-
trols its decisions in child custody disputes.67  In particular, the court
characterized the best interests standard as “firmly entrenched in Ma-
ryland”68 and “‘of transcendent importance’” in disputes over the cus-
tody of a child.69  The court then identified two general categories of
custody disputes: (1) disputes between parents, and (2) disputes be-
tween a parent and a third party.70  When the dispute is between a
biological mother and father, the best interests standard governs.71
This standard also governs in disputes between a parent and a third
party.72  But for third parties to prevail, they must also meet a height-
ened standard to overcome the presumption that parental custody is
in the child’s best interests.73  To rebut the presumption, a third party
must show that either (1) the legal parent is unfit to have custody, or
(2) exceptional circumstances render custody in the legal parent det-
rimental to the best interests of the child.74
The Hoffman court acknowledged Ms. Ross’s presumptive right to
custody and ruled that because she was fit to have custody, Mr. and
Mrs. Hoffman had to show exceptional circumstances to overcome
that presumption.75  Because of the strong attachment between the
child and Mr. and Mrs. Hoffman, the possible emotional effects on
the child if the court were to order a change in custody, the uncertain
Md. at 178, 372 A.2d at 587 (collecting authorities recognizing and applying the best inter-
ests of the child standard).
66. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 179, 181–82, 372 A.2d at 587–89.
67. Id. at 174–75, 372 A.2d at 585.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 175 n.1, 372 A.2d at 585 n.1 (quoting Dietrich, 185 Md. at 116, 43 A.2d at 191).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also noted in Monroe v. Monroe that the best interests of
the child is “the critical and overriding consideration.”  329 Md. 758, 769, 621 A.2d 898,
903 (1993) (citing McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 481, 593 A.2d 1128, 1130 (1991);
Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (1986)).
70. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 174, 372 A.2d at 585.  In McDermott v. Dougherty, another third
party custody case, the Court of Appeals identified a third category of custody disputes:
state intervention in a child’s parental situation to protect the child from harm.  385 Md. at
355, 869 A.2d at 771.  In such disputes, the best interests standard applies after a finding
that it is necessary for the state to interfere with a parent’s right to protect the child from
harm caused by the parent. Id.
71. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 175, 372 A.2d at 585.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 178–79, 372 A.2d at 587.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 180, 187, 372 A.2d at 588, 591.
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stability of Ms. Ross’s household, and the lapse of time before Ms.
Ross attempted to reclaim her child, the court held that the lower
court properly found exceptional circumstances to rebut the pre-
sumption that Ms. Ross should be awarded custody.76  In its decision,
the court also articulated the factors Maryland courts should consider
when determining the existence of exceptional circumstances in third
party custody disputes, which included:
the length of time the child has been away from the biologi-
cal parent, the age of the child when care was assumed by
the third party, the possible emotional effect on the child of
a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed before
the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and
strength of the ties between the child and the third party
custodian, the intensity and genuineness of the parent’s de-
sire to have the child, [and] the stability and certainty as to
the child’s future in the custody of the parent.77
In Monroe v. Monroe,78 the Court of Appeals explained that the
cases on which the lower court relied, including Hoffman, “d[id] not
exhaustively or finally define the universe” of exceptional circum-
stances that warrant granting custody to a third party because these
cases did not account for circumstances in which the biological parent
was present in the child’s life.79  The court found that psychological
bonding and dependence between a third party and a child sufficient
to constitute exceptional circumstances can develop during an ongo-
ing legal parent-child relationship, particularly when the legal parent
fosters and encourages the child’s bonding with the third party.80  In
Monroe, after the respondent learned through blood tests that he was
not the biological father of a child he had raised as his own with the
child’s biological mother for the first few years of the child’s life, he
sought custody of the child as a third party.81  The court identified
76. Id. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594.
77. Id. at 191, 372 A.2d at 593.
78. 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
79. Id. at 773–76, 621 A.2d at 905–06.
80. Id. at 775–76, 621 A.2d at 906.
81. Id. at 760–62, 621 A.2d at 899–900.  After raising the child together for two and a
half years after the child’s birth, the respondent and the petitioner, the child’s mother,
married. Id. at 760–61, 621 A.2d at 899.  A year later, the couple separated and agreed to
joint custody of the child. Id. at 761, 621 A.2d at 899; Monroe v. Monroe, 88 Md. App. 132,
135, 594 A.2d 577, 579 (1991).  The agreement provided that the child would reside with
the petitioner, that the respondent would have visitation rights, and that neither party
would move from Maryland with the child without the express consent of the other party.
Monroe, 329 Md. at 761, 621 A.2d at 899.  When the petitioner moved out of Maryland with
the child, the respondent filed a motion for temporary and exclusive custody. Id. at 762,
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evidence that proved that the child viewed the respondent as her fa-
ther, that they shared a parent-child bond, and that the respondent
had acted as the child’s “psychological father.”82  Accordingly, the
court determined that the trial court erred in focusing on the length
of time the child was separated from her legal parent instead of on
the relationship that developed between the child and third party.83
Moreover, the court concluded that enough evidence existed for a
trier of fact to find exceptional circumstances to rebut the presump-
tion that it was in a child’s best interests to grant custody to the biolog-
ical mother.84
In 2005, the Court of Appeals in McDermott v. Dougherty85 clarified
the rule in Maryland for determining custody between a parent and
pure third party by categorizing the three distinct approaches to cus-
tody dispute cases.86  In McDermott, maternal grandparents filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Maryland, seeking
third party custody of their grandson against the will of their grand-
son’s mother and father.87  The trial court awarded custody to the
grandparents on the grounds that the father’s employment in the
Marines required him to be away from home for months at a time,
and thus constituted exceptional circumstances.88  The Court of Ap-
peals reversed, explaining that under the heightened standard for
third party custody, the child’s father was a fit parent and no excep-
tional circumstances, including his decision to work in the Marines or
his periodic absences from home, warranted disturbing his constitu-
tional right to the custody of his child.89  According to the court, a
minority of states applied only a best interests standard to third party
621 A.2d at 899–900.  In response, the petitioner filed a motion to order blood tests to
establish the respondent’s paternity. Id., 621 A.2d at 900.  Blood tests confirmed that the
respondent was not the biological father. Id.
82. Id. at 776, 621 A.2d at 907.  The Janice M. court explained that the term “psycholog-
ical parent” is often used interchangeably with the term “de facto parent,” and refers to a
party who has a “parent-like” relationship to a child “as a result of ‘day-to-day interaction,
companionship, and shared experiences.’”  Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 681 n.8,
948 A.2d 73, 84–85 n.8 (2008) (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973)).
83. Monroe, 329 Md. at 775, 777, 621 A.2d at 906–07.
84. Id.
85. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005).
86. See id. at 356–57, 869 A.2d at 772–73 (comparing states’ approaches to determining
custody of a child in parent-third party custody disputes to clarify that, in Maryland, a court
must first find parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before applying the best
interests test).
87. Id. at 323–24, 869 A.2d at 753.
88. Id. at 324, 869 A.2d at 753.
89. Id. at 325–26, 869 A.2d at 754.
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custody disputes and did not require a finding of parental unfitness or
exceptional circumstances to award custody to a third party.90  The
court also observed that other state courts took a “hybrid view,” using
ambiguous language in their decisions, such that it was difficult to
determine whether the courts intended the third parties to show pa-
rental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before those courts
could consider the best interests of the child.91  Lastly, the Court of
Appeals noted that states applying the “majority view” recognized that,
because natural parents are presumed fit to raise their children and
have a constitutional right to custody, a court must find parental unfit-
ness or exceptional circumstances detrimental to the child’s welfare
before applying the best interests test.92
The court in McDermott acknowledged that, although Hoffman’s
language discussing the standard in third party custody dispute cases
in Maryland created “a conundrum of sorts,” Maryland’s view was con-
sistent with the majority view that it is necessary first to prove that the
legal parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances pose a serious
detriment to the child before the court may apply the best interests
standard.93  Applying this rule, the McDermott court concluded that
maternal grandparents petitioning for sole custody of a child over the
objections of the child’s biological father were not entitled to custody
because they could not prove parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances.94
Although Maryland courts originally applied the heightened stan-
dard of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances only to third
party custody disputes, the Court of Appeals in Koshko v. Haining95
extended the standard to third party visitation disputes.96  In Koshko,
maternal grandparents Mr. and Mrs. Haining sought visitation of their
grandchildren over the objections of the children’s legal parents, Mr.
90. Id. at 357–61, 869 A.2d at 773–74 (listing Colorado, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia as states that appear to take the minority approach to pure third party custody
disputes).
91. Id. at 361–75, 869 A.2d at 775–83.  According to the McDermott court, hybrid view
states included Oregon, Connecticut, Vermont, Washington, Missouri, Louisiana, Maine,
Nevada, Arkansas, Nebraska, Texas, perhaps California, and until this decision, perhaps
Maryland.  Id. at 361, 869 A.2d at 775.  In some hybrid states, the court noted, intermediate
appellate courts rendered conflicting decisions in third party custody disputes. Id.  In
other hybrid states, the same opinion contained both positions. Id.
92. Id. at 375, 869 A.2d at 783.
93. Id. at 372, 374–75, 869 A.2d at 781, 783.
94. Id. at 435, 869 A.2d at 818–19.
95. 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
96. Id. at 430–31, 440–41, 444–45, 921 A.2d at 186, 192–93, 195.
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and Mrs. Koshko.97  The Hainings lived with and helped raise one of
their grandchildren for a few years before their relationship with the
Koshkos deteriorated.98  After not communicating with the Hainings
for several months, the Koshkos offered them a single visit with the
children, with the possibility of future visits.99  The Hainings, however,
demanded a more consistent visitation schedule with their grandchil-
dren, and soon thereafter filed a petition for visitation.100
Before Koshko, the Court of Appeals noted, Maryland courts had
applied the presumption that parents acted in the best interests of
their children in custody cases, but deemed the presumption to be
“‘weaker’” in visitation cases.101  In Koshko, however, the court estab-
lished that “visitation is a species of custody” and that although “visita-
tion involves a lesser degree of intrusion on the fundamental right to
parent” than custody, the differences between visitation and custody
are not constitutionally significant.102  The court explained that be-
cause visitation is still an intrusion upon the constitutional right of
parents to the care, custody, and control of their children, visitation
merits the same rigorous scrutiny applicable to custody disputes.103
Thus, under Koshko, third parties seeking visitation over the objections
of a parent must show that the parent is unfit or exceptional circum-
stances warrant third party visitation.104
97. Id. at 408, 921 A.2d at 173.
98. Id. at 408–09, 921 A.2d at 173–74.
99. Id. at 410, 921 A.2d at 174.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 434 & n.14, 921 A.2d at 188–89 & n.14 (quoting Wolinkski v. Browneller, 115
Md. App. 285, 316–17, 693 A.2d 30, 45 (1997), overruled by Koshko, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d
171).
102. Id. at 429–30, 921 A.2d at 185–86.
103. Id. at 430–31, 921 A.2d at 186.
104. Id. at 440–41, 921 A.2d at 192–93.  Applying the heightened standard, the Koshko
court ruled that Maryland’s grandparent visitation statute, which authorized a court to
grant grandparental visitation if in the best interests of the child, was unconstitutional as
applied because it failed to require the Hainings to make a threshold showing of either
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances. Id. at 407–08, 424, 444–45, 921 A.2d at
172–73, 182, 195.  The court thus reversed the Court of Special Appeals’ decision to grant
the grandparents visitation rights and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
under the new heightened standard for third party visitation. Id. at 444–45, 921 A.2d at
195.
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C. Before the Court of Appeals Extended the Heightened Standard to
Third Party Visitation Disputes, the Court of Special Appeals
Did Not Require De Facto Parents to Prove the Same
Heightened Standard When Seeking Visitation
In S.F. v. M.D.,105 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found
that the heightened standard for obtaining custody or visitation of a
child did not apply in third party visitation cases where the third party
was a de facto parent.106  The court adopted its test for establishing de
facto parenthood from In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,107 a Wisconsin case
in which the test originated.108  Under the H.S.H.-K. four-part test, to
qualify as a de facto parent:
[T]he legal parent must consent to and foster the relation-
ship between the third party and the child; the third party
must have lived with the child; the third party must perform
parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and
most important, a parent-child bond must be forged.109
The court in S.F. acknowledged that, in third party custody disputes,
there is always a presumption that it is in the child’s best interest to
award custody to the legal parent, and this presumption is only over-
come when a third party, including a de facto parent, demonstrates
that the legal parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances justify the
third party’s custody.110  However, the court noted that in third party
visitation disputes in which the third party is a de facto parent, no
presumption favoring the biological or legal parent exists.111  Thus,
de facto parents seeking visitation need not show parental unfitness or
exceptional circumstances.112
105. 132 Md. App. 99, 751 A.2d 9 (2000), overruled by Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md.
661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008).
106. Id. at 111–12, 751 A.2d at 15.
107. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
108. See S.F., 132 Md. App. at 111, 751 A.2d at 15 (adopting the H.S.H.-K. test for de
facto parenthood); see also Janice M., 404 Md. at 697, 948 A.2d at 94 (Raker, J., dissenting)
(“The de facto parent test has its origins in the Wisconsin case of In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.”).
In addition to developing the de facto parent test, the court in H.S.H.-K. noted that al-
though there was little uniformity in case law on visitation by third parties over the objec-
tions of a legal parent, courts “have observed a judicial trend toward considering or
allowing visitation to nonparents who have a parent-like relationship with the child if visita-
tion would be in the best interest of the child.”  533 N.W.2d at 435 n.37.
109. S.F., 132 Md. App. at 111, 751 A.2d at 15 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551
(N.J. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. Id. at 110–11, 751 A.2d at 15.
111. Id. at 111, 751 A.2d at 15.
112. Id. at 111–12, 751 A.2d at 15.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-3\MLR305.txt unknown Seq: 15 21-APR-09 11:09
2009] JANICE M. V. MARGARET K. 705
Applying this de facto parent exception, the S.F. court found that
a mother’s former domestic partner, who helped raise the mother’s
biological child for three years, was a de facto parent and thus needed
to show only that her visitation was in the child’s best interests.113
Under this standard, the court held that the trial court did not err or
abuse its discretion in finding that it would not be in the best interests
of the child to award visitation to the former domestic partner be-
cause the child developed behavioral problems associated with the
split-parent visitation.114
D. Other States that Recognize the De Facto Parent Doctrine Hold that
De Facto Parents Stand in Legal Parity with Legal Parents and
Apply a Best Interests Standard in Visitation Disputes
Several state courts, which have recognized in common law that
de facto parent status stands in parity with legal parent status, do not
apply the heightened standard of parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances to de facto parent visitation disputes.115  Instead, these
courts accord de facto parents visitation based on the best interests of
the child.116
For example, in E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,117 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts assessed only the child’s best interests in considering
whether a single justice of the appeals court erred in reinstating the
probate court judge’s order granting visitation rights to the child’s de
facto parent.118  To determine the best interests of the child, the court
examined the child’s relationship with both the legal parent and the
de facto parent.119  The court reasoned that recognizing de facto
parenthood was “in accord with notions of the modern family,” partic-
ularly because “[a]n increasing number of same gender couples . . .
are deciding to have children” and to form “nontraditional fami-
lies.”120  Under a best interests standard, the court concluded that the
single justice did not err because the de facto parent lived with, finan-
cially supported, and actively participated in raising the child, and be-
113. Id. at 102–03, 114, 751 A.2d at 10–11, 16–17.
114. Id. at 114–15, 117–18, 751 A.2d at 17–19.  The court in S.F. noted that the child’s
behavioral problems were likely a result of the child’s inability to “negotiate both relation-
ships at the same time, and the parties had not been successful in enabling the child to do
that.” Id. at 117, 751 A.2d at 18.
115. See infra notes 117–131 and accompanying text. R
116. See infra notes 117–131 and accompanying text. R
117. 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
118. Id. at 892–93.
119. Id. at 891.
120. Id.
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cause the legal parent and the de facto parent agreed that continuing
the child’s relationship with his de facto parent, in the event the par-
ents terminated their relationship, would promote the child’s best
interests.121
In V.C. v. M.J.B.,122 the Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly
found that once the court determines that a third party is the psycho-
logical parent of a child, that third party is in parity with the legal
parent and both custody and visitation disputes turn on the best inter-
ests standard alone.123  When evidence concerning a child’s best inter-
ests equally supports custody by the legal parent and the de facto
parent, the court will award custody to the legal parent.124  In visita-
tion disputes, however, if the evidence weighs equally in favor of a
legal parent and a de facto parent, the court will treat the dispute as if
it were between two natural parents and assess factors for determining
the best interests of the child.125  Applying this standard, the court
held that a biological mother’s former same-sex domestic partner who
sought custody and visitation of the mother’s twins was a psychological
parent to the children, and that visitation with the ex-partner was in
the children’s best interests.126  But because the psychological parent
was not involved in decision-making for the twins for four years while
the case was pending, the court refused to grant her joint legal cus-
tody for decision-making purposes.127
In the case of In re Parentage of L.B.,128 the Supreme Court of
Washington granted a woman standing under Washington law to peti-
tion the court for co-parentage of her non-adopted, former domestic
partner’s biological daughter because Washington common law rec-
ognized de facto parenthood and granted de facto parents the same
rights and responsibilities given to legal parents.129  The court held
that de facto parents are in “legal parity” with legal parents and are
thus entitled to parental rights based on the court’s determination of
the best interests of the child.130  In its reasoning, the court noted that
common sense supported recognition of de facto parents by common
121. Id. at 888, 892–93.  The legal parent and the de facto parent were two women who
were involved in a committed relationship for thirteen years. Id.
122. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
123. Id. at 554.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 541–42, 555.
127. Id. at 555.
128. 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
129. Id. at 163.
130. Id. at 177.
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law, even where state statutes failed to specifically define the rights of
parents in nontraditional parenting arrangements, because “statutes
often fail to contemplate all potential scenarios which may arise in the
ever changing and evolving notion of familial relations.”131
III. COURT’S REASONING
In Janice M. v. Margaret K.,132 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that de facto parent status is not a recognized legal status in Ma-
ryland and that the circuit court thus erred in granting Margaret visi-
tation based on her status as a de facto parent.133  The court reasoned
that permitting de facto parents to establish visitation based solely on
a best interests standard, without first showing unfitness of the legal
parent or exceptional circumstances, contravened Maryland law.134
The court thus remanded the case to determine whether Margaret
was entitled to visitation under a parental unfitness or exceptional cir-
cumstances standard.135
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Bell began by establishing
that because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects parents’ right “to direct and govern the care, custody, and
control of their children,”136 a non-governmental third party generally
has no right to custody against the fundamental constitutional right of
the legal parent to raise his or her own child.137  Accordingly, the
court held that where a third party seeks custody, before considering
the best interests of the child, courts must first find that either the
legal parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances show that the child
could suffer serious detriment if he or she remained in the custody of
the legal parent.138  The court then noted that although third party
visitation is generally less intrusive on the rights of legal parents than
third party custody, the same standard for determining a child’s cus-
tody should nonetheless apply to visitation disputes.139
131. Id. at 176.
132. 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008).
133. Id. at 664, 695–96, 948 A.2d at 74, 93–94.
134. Id. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87.
135. Id. at 695–96, 948 A.2d at 93–94.
136. Id. at 671, 948 A.2d at 79.  Judges Battaglia, Cathell, Greene, Harrell, and Wilner
joined Chief Judge Bell’s majority opinion.
137. Id. at 675–76, 948 A.2d at 81 (quoting McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 353,
869 A.2d 751, 770 (2005)).
138. Id. at 676, 948 A.2d at 81.
139. Id. at 677–80, 948 A.2d at 82–84 (quoting Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 430–31,
440–41, 921 A.2d 171, 186, 192–93 (2007)).
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The court then acknowledged that Janice M. was its first case in-
volving third party custody or visitation disputes where the third party
was a de facto parent.140  Thus, the court had never determined
whether a de facto parent, like a third party, must demonstrate paren-
tal unfitness or exceptional circumstances to justify visitation or cus-
tody over a legal parent’s objections.141  The court recognized,
however, that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals had considered
the issue in S.F. v. M.D., holding that de facto parents seeking visita-
tion needed to show only that visitation was in the child’s best inter-
ests to prevail.142  According to Chief Judge Bell, although the Court
of Special Appeals in S.F. recognized a legal parent’s constitutional
right to the custody of his or her own child, it nonetheless concluded
that in visitation disputes, the best interests of the child may take pre-
cedence over a parent’s interests.143
Based on the court’s holdings in McDermott and Koshko that estab-
lished that a third party seeking custody or visitation must prove pa-
rental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before the court can
apply the best interests of the child test, the Court of Appeals in this
case overruled the lower court’s decision in S.F.144  Applying its new
rule, the Janice M. court also reversed the circuit court’s decision in
this case as to visitation, finding that it erred in granting Margaret
visitation based on her status as Maya’s de facto parent without first
determining whether Janice was unfit or whether exceptional circum-
stances existed to overcome Janice’s constitutional right to Maya’s
care, custody, and control.145  Because the circuit court found Janice
to be a fit parent, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to deter-
mine whether exceptional circumstances show that visitation with
Margaret is in Maya’s best interests.146  The court explained that ex-
ceptional circumstances are based on all factors relevant to the partic-
ular case.147  The court also explained that a finding that a third party
140. Id. at 683, 948 A.2d at 86.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 683–85, 948 A.2d at 86–87 (citing S.F. v. M.D., 132 Md. App. 99, 111–12, 751
A.2d 9, 15 (2000)); see supra Part II.C. (discussing S.F. v. M.D.).
143. Janice M., 404 Md. at 684, 948 A.2d at 86 (quoting S.F., 132 Md. App. at 109, 751
A.2d at 14).
144. Id. at 685–86, 948 A.2d at 87.
145. Id. at 695, 948 A.2d at 93.
146. Id. at 682, 695–96, 948 A.2d at 85, 93–94.
147. Id. at 695, 948 A.2d at 93.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text for a list of R
factors set forth in Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977), that the court stated
the circuit court should consider on remand in determining whether exceptional circum-
stances exist.  Other important factors for the court to consider include the stability of the
child’s current home, whether the child is part of an ongoing family unit, the child’s physi-
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meets the requirements for de facto parent status, were the court to
recognize that status, is a strong factor, but is not determative in as-
sessing whether exceptional circumstances exist.148
Additionally, the court noted that neither party contended at oral
argument that the fact that the dispute arose between a same-sex
couple should bear on the court’s analysis.149  Further, when asked,
Margaret agreed that although there is no legal or statutory authority
in Maryland for adoption by same-sex couples, she could have at-
tempted to adopt Maya in Maryland.150  The court also recognized
that several other states have created statutes granting visitation rights
to de facto parents over the objections of legal parents, but found that
only the Maryland General Assembly had the authority to enact simi-
lar legislation in Maryland.151
Judge Raker dissented, arguing that the court should recognize
de facto parenthood.152  Accordingly, Judge Raker rejected the major-
ity’s holding that the threshold determinations of parental unfitness
or exceptional circumstances, rather than the best interests standard,
should determine a de facto parent’s visitation rights.153  Judge Raker
noted that the opinions the majority relied on in establishing its stan-
dard did not address the issue in this case because they involved cus-
tody and visitation disputes between legal parents and “pure third
parties,” not between legal parents and de facto parents.154  In fact,
Judge Raker argued, other Maryland precedent supported the de
facto parent doctrine and the notion that de facto parent status is
different from third party status with respect to custody and visitation
disputes.155
Judge Raker further argued that Maryland courts should decide
that de facto parenthood is in parity with legal parenthood in visita-
cal, mental, and emotional needs, and the child’s past relationship with the third party.
Janice M., 404 Md. at 694, 948 A.2d at 93 (quoting Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 116–17,
607 A.2d 935, 940 (1992)).
148. Janice M., 404 Md. at 695, 948 A.2d at 93.  See supra note 109 and accompanying R
text for a description of the de facto parenthood test established in In re Custody of H.S.H.-
K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
149. Janice M., 404 Md. at 686, 948 A.2d at 88.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 686–87, 689, 948 A.2d at 88–89. Chief Judge Bell further established that the
court had no view as to the federal or state constitutionality of statutes granting visitation to
de facto parents. Id. at 689, 948 A.2d at 89.
152. Id. at 696–97, 948 A.2d at 94 (Raker, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 706, 948 A.2d at 99–100.
155. Id. at 706–07, 948 A.2d at 100 (citing Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d
898 (1993)).
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tion matters.156  Judge Raker explained that many other states have
recognized that de facto parent status entitles an otherwise third party
to the same rights as a legal parent in custody or visitation disputes,
especially because recognizing de facto parenthood “‘accord[s] with
notions of the modern family.’”157  According to Judge Raker, other
courts have recognized that advancing technologies and evolving no-
tions of the traditional family unit have forced courts to adapt the
common law to give de facto parents the same rights and responsibili-
ties as legal parents.158
Consequently, Judge Raker concluded that because a de facto
parent is “in parity” with a legal parent, granting parental rights to a
de facto parent does not implicate the legal parent’s constitutional
right to the care, custody, and control of his or her own child.159
Thus, Judge Raker stated, de facto parenthood is not inconsistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence protecting the interests of legal par-
ents.160  Moreover, Judge Raker explained, the high standard for es-
tablishing de facto parent status minimizes the likelihood that courts
could apply the status too broadly, opening “the floodgates” for claims
by third parties seeking custody or visitation.161  According to Judge
Raker, the strict requirements for becoming a de facto parent avoid
unnecessary intrusions into the legal parent-child relationship.162  Fi-
nally, Judge Raker suggested that the court should recognize de facto
parent status because the law on adoption by same-sex couples is un-
resolved in Maryland.163
IV. ANALYSIS
In Janice M. v. Margaret K., the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that de facto parenthood is not a recognized legal status in Mary-
land.164  The court thus found that the trial court erred in granting
Margaret visitation of her non-biological, non-adopted child based on
156. Id. at 703, 948 A.2d at 98.
157. Id. at 700–03, 948 A.2d at 96–98 (quoting E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 866, 891
(Mass. 1999)).  Judge Raker cited cases recognizing the special status of de facto parents
from courts in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, New Mexico, Washington, Maine,
South Carolina, Indiana, and Colorado. Id.
158. Id. at 701–02, 948 A.2d at 97 (quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 165,
176–77 (Wash. 2005)).
159. Id. at 703, 948 A.2d at 98.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 698, 948 A.2d at 95.
162. Id. at 699–700, 948 A.2d at 96 (quoting AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(c) cmt. c (2003)).
163. Id. at 696 n.1, 948 A.2d at 94 n.1.
164. Id. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87 (majority opinion).
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her status as a de facto parent without first determining whether the
child’s legal parent was unfit or exceptional circumstances entitled
Margaret to visitation.165  The court found that in light of parents’
fundamental constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of
their children, and Maryland precedent requiring third parties to
show a heightened standard of parental unfitness or exceptional cir-
cumstances, the same heightened standard should apply to de facto
parents seeking visitation.166  In so holding, the court failed to appre-
ciate that the de facto parent doctrine does not interfere with the con-
stitutional rights of parents because, unlike statutes invalidated by the
Supreme Court that made child-rearing decisions for parents, the de
facto parent test requires legal parents to consent to the de facto par-
ent-child relationship.167  As such, the test limits the number of third
parties eligible to become de facto parents.168  By failing to distinguish
pure third parties from de facto parents, the court also inappropri-
ately relied on cases involving only the former.169  Additionally, recog-
nition of de facto parenthood would, in some cases, better protect
same-sex couples’ parental rights because same-sex parent adoption is
unsettled in Maryland, leaving non-biological, non-adoptive parents
without rights to children they have helped raise.170  Finally, unlike
several other state courts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland unneces-
sarily deferred to the legislature to decide whether to grant visitation
rights to de facto parents.171  In fact, the court may have effectively
prevented the legislature from exercising its discretion by suggesting
that such a statute might be unconstitutional under the court’s broad
interpretation of the Maryland constitution to more extensively pro-
tect fundamental rights, including the right of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children.172
A. Recognition of De Facto Parenthood Is Consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment Right of Legal Parents to the Care, Custody, and
Control of Their Children
The Court of Appeals could have recognized the de facto parent
doctrine without disturbing the constitutional right of legal parents to
the care, custody, and control of their children because the strict test
165. Id. at 695, 948 A.2d at 93.
166. Id. at 664, 685–86, 948 A.2d at 74–75, 87.
167. See infra Part IV.A.
168. See infra Part IV.A.
169. See infra Part IV.B.
170. See infra Part IV.C.
171. See infra Part IV.D.
172. See infra Part IV.D.
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for establishing de facto parent status requires that the legal parent
not only consent to, but also foster the child’s relationship with the de
facto parent.173  Moreover, this high standard for de facto parenthood
narrows the class of people eligible for custody or visitation.174
Unlike the statutes the Supreme Court has invalidated, which
were designed by states to limit parents’ ability to control the care and
custody of their children, the de facto parent doctrine respects par-
ents’ own determinations of their children’s best interests.175  In both
Meyer and Pierce, for example, the Supreme Court decided that state
laws, made by others hardly within a family circle, that unreasonably
interfered with parents’ authority to make decisions for their children
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.176  The de facto parent test, in
contrast, requires that a legal parent consent to and foster the forma-
tion of the de facto parent relationship.177  Unlike statutes that im-
pose child-rearing decisions on parents without their consent, the de
facto parent doctrine recognizes the voluntary, autonomous decisions
of legal parents to permit third parties to develop parent-like relation-
ships with their children and to foster such relationships.178  Because
the legal parent thus controls the relationship between his or her
173. Cf. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 684, 948 A.2d 73, 87 (2008) (explaining
that, under the four-prong de facto parent test established by In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship be-
tween the third party and the child).
174. See id. at 704, 948 A.2d at 98 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that the de facto parent
test is “narrowly tailored and allows a person to overcome the presumption in favor of a
natural parent’s rights only after that party demonstrates that he or she is in essence a
parent to the child”).
175. Compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (determining that a state
statute forbidding the teaching of certain languages in public school “materially . . . inter-
fere[d]” with parents’ ability to control their children’s education), and Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534–35 (1925) (finding that a state statute requiring parents to
send their children to public school impermissibly intruded on parents’ constitutional
right to direct the upbringing of their children), with Janice M., 404 Md. at 700, 948 A.2d at
96 (explaining that the requirement that legal parents consent to the de facto parent-child
relationship “again assuages any fear that the standard conflicts with the liberty interest of
parents in the custody and care of their children”).
176. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530, 532–36 (finding that a state statute that required parents
to send their children to public school interfered with parents’ right to direct the educa-
tion of their children and threatened injury to appellees’ private school business and prop-
erty); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 401, 403 (deciding that a state statute that forbade the
teaching of specific languages in public schools was unconstitutional because it interfered
with parents’ control of their children’s education and because the statute was not reasona-
bly related to its alleged purpose of allowing children to learn English before any other
language and of establishing English as the “mother tongue” of the state).
177. See Janice M., 404 Md. at 684, 948 A.2d at 87 (majority opinion).
178. See id. at 704, 948 A.2d at 98 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that, under the de facto
parent test, “ ‘a person who performed parental functions is not entitled to de facto parent
status unless the court finds as a fact that the child’s legal parent has actually fostered such
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child and the de facto parent, the recognition of de facto parenthood
is not a traditionally prohibited interference with constitutionally pro-
tected parent-child relationships.179
The de facto parent doctrine also does not interfere with the con-
stitutional protections afforded to parent-child relationships because
the high threshold for establishing de facto parent status limits the
third parties eligible to obtain custody or visitation of a child.  In
Troxel, the Supreme Court determined that, because the visitation stat-
ute failed to defer to parents’ decisions concerning third party visita-
tion of their children, the statute failed to honor the traditional
presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,
thus violating the constitutional protections to which legal parents are
entitled.180  The de facto parent test, by contrast, is a narrow test that
protects parents’ interests by limiting the third parties who are legally
eligible to seek custody or visitation under the doctrine.181  As Judge
Raker noted in her dissent, this high standard also ensures that the
recognition of de facto parenthood will not “open the floodgates for
litigation” by any third party, such as babysitters or foster parents.182
a relationship’” (quoting Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md. App. 528, 539, 910 A.2d 1145,
1152 (2006))).
179. See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005) (explaining that the
threshold requirement that the legal parent consent to and foster the de facto parent-child
relationship is critical to the constitutional analysis because it suggests that de facto parent
status can only be achieved through the active encouragement of the legal parent, thus
ensuring that the recognition of de facto parenthood does not infringe on the constitu-
tional rights of legal parents); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551–52 (N.J. 2000)
(noting that a legal parent’s consent and fostering of the de facto parent relationship is
critical because it requires the legal parent’s participation in the creation of the relation-
ship and it places control in the hands of the legal parent).
180. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67–70 (2000).  The Court in Troxel found that
because the visitation statute permitted “‘any person’” to petition for visitation of a child
“‘at any time,’” if the visitation was in the best interests of the child, the statute inappropri-
ately subjected the decisions of parents concerning visitation of their children to state
court review. Id. at 67 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).
181. See Janice M., 404 Md. at 698, 948 A.2d at 95 (noting that the four-part de facto
parent test that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted in H.S.H.-K. “set forth a high bar
for establishing de facto parent status, minimizing concerns that it could be applied too
broadly”).
182. Id. Judge Raker argued that the high bar for establishing de facto parent status
thus “eliminates the majority’s fear” that recognizing the de facto parent doctrine will bur-
den the courts and produce a flood of litigation. Id.
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B. The Court of Appeals Failed to Distinguish Third Parties from De
Facto Parents and Thus Improperly Relied on Cases Establishing the
Custody and Visitation Standard for Pure Third Parties
In holding that de facto parents must show the heightened cus-
tody or visitation standard of parental unfitness or exceptional cir-
cumstances, the Janice M. court improperly relied on prior cases
applying this standard to pure third parties.183  In light of the constitu-
tional right of parents to govern the care, custody, and control of their
children, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in both Koshko and McDer-
mott held that, to prevail, third parties seeking custody or visitation
over legal parents’ objections must make a threshold showing of ei-
ther parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.184  Applying the
holdings from Koshko and McDermott, the Janice M. court ruled that the
same heightened standard should also apply to de facto parents seek-
ing custody or visitation.185
The court in Janice M. failed to recognize that the test for award-
ing third party custody in McDermott applied only to pure third parties,
not to de facto parents.  In McDermott, the Court of Appeals held that
under the heightened standard for third party custody, the trial court
erred in awarding custody to maternal grandparents because the
child’s father was fit and no exceptional circumstances warranted dis-
turbing his constitutional right to the custody of his child.186  In so
holding, the McDermott court distinguished third parties from “physio-
logical parents”187 with respect to the application of the heightened
standard of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.188  The
court determined that, within the general category of parent-third
party disputes, a subset of cases involving third parties classified by
some states as “physiological parents” were decided according to the
standards that apply in parent-parent disputes.189  The court acknowl-
183. See infra notes 184–193 and accompanying text. R
184. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 440–41, 921 A.2d 171, 192–93 (2007); McDermott
v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 325, 418, 869 A.2d 751, 754, 808 (2005).
185. Janice M., 404 Md. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87 (majority opinion).
186. McDermott, 385 Md. at 325–26, 869 A.2d at 754.
187. The court defined “physiological parents” as “third parties who have, in effect, be-
come parents.” Id. at 356, 869 A.2d at 772. See also Janice M., 404 Md. at 706, 948 A.2d at
99–100 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that McDermott “delineat[ed] the distinction between
‘pure third-party cases’ and cases involving ‘psychological [sic] parents, third parties who
have, in effect, become parents’” (quoting McDermott, 385 Md. at 356, 869 A.2d at 772)).
188. McDermott, 385 Md. at 356–57, 869 A.2d at 772–73.
189. Id. at 355–56, 869 A.2d at 771–72.  The standard applicable to parent-parent dis-
putes is the best interests standard. Id. at 354–55, 869 A.2d at 771.  Although the majority
in Janice M. pointed out that the court in S.F. v. M.D. treated de facto parents as third
parties, this finding does not suggest that the same legal standard for determining visita-
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edged that McDermott was a “pure third party” case and thus focused its
analysis on other pure third party cases in applying the heightened
custody standard.190
The Court of Appeals in Janice M. also improperly relied on
Koshko in applying the heightened third party visitation standard to de
facto parents because Koshko similarly involved pure third parties.  In
Koshko, maternal grandparents sought visitation of their grandchil-
dren under Maryland’s grandparental visitation statute.191  The Koshko
court held that the same standard that applies to third party custody
disputes should apply to third party visitation disputes because, al-
though visitation may be less intrusive on parents’ constitutional
rights, it nonetheless constitutes an interference with parental rights
that requires the same rigorous scrutiny as third party custody dis-
putes.192  Although Koshko extended the heightened standard to visita-
tion, it did so in the context of pure third party disputes.193
Of course, distinguishing de facto parents from pure third parties
is important because unlike third parties, de facto parents are re-
quired to significantly participate in a child’s life for a sufficient
length of time to qualify for parental rights.194  Under the test for de
facto parenthood, the de facto parent must have lived with the
child.195  Additionally, establishing de facto parent status requires that
the legal parent foster the de facto parent-child relationship.196  Sepa-
rating de facto parents from children with whom they have lived and
developed a parent-child relationship nurtured by the legal parent
can substantially harm the children.197  Thus, recognizing the differ-
tion should apply because, as the court explained in McDermott, “physiological parents,” or
de facto parents, are a “subset” of third parties that must meet a different standard than
other third parties to establish a right to visitation. Janice M., 404 Md. at 684 n.9, 948 A.2d
at 86 n.9; McDermott, 385 Md. at 356, 869 A.2d at 772.
190. McDermott, 385 Md. at 356, 869 A.2d at 772.
191. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 407–08, 410, 921 A.2d 171, 171–74 (2007).
192. Id. at 430–31, 440–41, 444–45, 921 A.2d at 186, 192–93, 195.
193. See id. at 441, 444–45, 921 A.2d at 192–93, 195 (applying the heightened test for
third party visitation to third party maternal grandparents); see also Janice M., 404 Md. at
706, 948 A.2d at 99–100 (arguing that because Koshko “dealt with the rights of pure third
parties, and not those of de facto parents,” it did not address the issue before the court).
194. Janice M., 404 Md. at 700–01, 948 A.2d at 96–97 (quoting E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711
N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999)); see also In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435–36
(Wis. 1995) (explaining that a de facto parent must take significant responsibility for a
child’s care and act like a parent for a sufficient amount of time to establish a bond with
the child that is “parental in nature”).
195. Janice M., 404 Md. at 700–01, 948 A.2d at 96–97 (quoting E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at
891).
196. Id. at 698, 700–01, 948 A.2d at 95–96.
197. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 99 (2000) (“‘[I]n certain circumstances where
a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the
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ences between de facto parents and third parties, and adopting the
specific standard that applies to each, is especially important for the
well-being of the child.
C. Recognition of De Facto Parent Status Is a Valid Limitation on
Parents’ Constitutional Right to Govern the Care, Custody, and
Control of Their Children, Particularly Because Same-Sex
Parents’ Right to Adopt in Maryland is “Unsettled”
Even if the Court of Appeals found that distinguishing de facto
parents from pure third parties limits the constitutional rights of par-
ents, Supreme Court jurisprudence generally permits those limits.198
Further, if the court had recognized de facto parenthood, it could
have better protected same-sex parents’ right to visit their children
because, under Maryland’s adoption statutes, same-sex parents cannot
both be legal parents of the same child.199  Given the changing no-
tions of the modern family and the increased number of “nontradi-
tional” family units, the court should have instead made it easier for
de facto parents to seek visitation without showing the high standard
used in custody disputes.200  A more lenient standard would thus pro-
tect same-sex parents’ tenuous rights as a valid limitation on legal par-
ents’ constitutional rights to raise their children.201
1. Even if Recognition of De Facto Parent Status Limits Parents’
Constitutional Rights, Supreme Court Jurisprudence Permits
Some Limits
Recognizing a de facto parent’s right to seek visitation without a
threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances
does not unduly limit the constitutional right of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children because the high standard for
establishing de facto parent status requires legal parents to consent to
and foster the parent-like relationship with their children.202  In fact,
child of the relationship could cause severe psychological harm to the child . . . .’” (quot-
ing In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998))); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550
(N.J. 2000) (“At the heart of the psychological parent cases is a recognition that children
have a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and
provide for them.  That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the
emotional bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.”
(citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977))).
198. See infra Part IV.C.1.
199. See infra Part IV.C.2.
200. See infra Part IV.C.2.
201. See infra Part IV.C.2.
202. See supra note 173, 175–179 and accompanying text. R
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the Supreme Court has not prohibited de facto parents from seeking
visitation under only a best interests standard.203  The Troxel Court did
not determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause required non-parental third party visitation statutes to include
a showing of harm or potential harm to the child before authorizing
the court to grant visitation.204  Instead, the Court in Troxel deter-
mined only that legal parents’ decisions concerning visitation are enti-
tled to “at least some special weight,” but did not define the scope of
parental rights in visitation disputes.205  Thus, as the dissenting opin-
ion in Janice M. acknowledged, de facto parents should have the same
status as legal parents in visitation disputes, and although Supreme
Court jurisprudence is not binding on Maryland law, determining visi-
tation based on a best interests standard is consistent with the Court’s
holding in Troxel.206
Moreover, even if the Court of Appeals were to find that granting
de facto parents visitation rights without requiring them to show pa-
rental unfitness or exceptional circumstances limited legal parents’
constitutional right to raise their children, it is well settled that paren-
tal rights are not beyond limitation.207  In Prince, for example, the Su-
203. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (finding that the Court did not de-
fine the “precise scope” of parental due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
in the context of visitation).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 70, 73.  The Troxel Court held that the Washington Supreme Court unconsti-
tutionally applied a state statute permitting any third party to petition for visitation of a
child at any time over a legal parent’s decision not to allow visitation because the statute
permitted the court to overlook the traditional presumption that parents make decisions
in their children’s best interests. Id. at 67–68, 72–73.  The Court also noted that although
the Washington Supreme Court deemed the statute unconstitutional based on its failure to
require third parties to show harm or potential harm to the child before the court permits
state interference with parental rights, the Court rested its holding only on the statute’s
breadth. Id. at 63, 67, 73.
206. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 703, 948 A.2d 73, 98 (2008) (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the de facto parent test is not inconsistent with Troxel because the
Court in Troxel did not determine whether a finding of parental unfitness was a condition
precedent to according rights to a third party in visitation disputes).
207. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (explaining that
rights of parenthood are not beyond limitation and that the state, as “parens patriae,” may
restrict parental control to protect a child’s well-being, including requiring school attend-
ance or prohibiting child labor).  Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that
courts of equity have power over minors and can exercise jurisdiction in gaining custody of
children from legal parents when necessary to secure the welfare and promote the best
interests of the child.  Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174–75, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977)
(citing Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 162, 55 A.2d 487, 489 (1947)).  Courts in Maryland
have thus limited legal parents’ constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of
their children by determining that exceptional circumstances exist to rebut the presump-
tion that custody in the legal parent is in the best interests of the child. See Monroe v.
Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 776–77, 621 A.2d 898, 906–07 (1993) (deciding that exceptional
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preme Court found that the state has the power to limit parental
freedom in matters affecting children’s welfare.208  The Troxel Court
similarly suggested that a state may interfere with parental rights
under special circumstances.209  In fact, the Troxel plurality noted that
one of the problems with the Washington Superior Court’s order to
award visitation to paternal grandparents under Washington’s visita-
tion statute was its failure to rely on any “special factors” that justified
state interference with the legal parent’s decisions.210  By failing to
expressly identify the factors that would justify overcoming the pre-
sumption that legal parents’ visitation decisions are in their children’s
best interests, the Court left open the possibility that de facto
parenthood is one of those special factors.211
2. Recognition of De Facto Parenthood Is a Justified Limitation on
Legal Parents’ Constitutional Rights Because it Protects
Same-Sex Couples’ Ability to Parent in Maryland
Granting de facto parents special rights to visitation by requiring
them to prove a lower, best-interests-only standard, protects non-mari-
tal, same-sex couples from losing the right to see the children they
circumstances authorized the trial court to award custody to a nonbiological father of a
child, over the objections of the biological mother, where the father raised the child with
the biological mother for the first few years of the child’s life and developed a psychologi-
cal bond with the child); see also Hoffman, 280 Md. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594 (holding that the
chancellor properly concluded that (1) exceptional circumstances existed to rebut the pre-
sumption that custody should be awarded to a child’s biological mother; and (2) custody in
the third party who raised the child was in the child’s best interests).
208. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67.
209. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (noting that “special factors” may justify state interference
with parents’ fundamental rights to make decisions concerning the interests of their
children).
210. See id. at 60–61, 67–68 (explaining that the record suggested that the superior
court’s order granting visitation to paternal grandparents over the restrictions on visitation
imposed by the children’s biological mother was based solely on the Washington statute
authorizing any person to petition for visitation if such visitation was in the best interests of
the child, and not on “special factors” authorizing state interference with parental rights);
see also Janice M., 404 Md. at 705–06, 948 A.2d at 99 (arguing that Troxel did not prohibit
the recognition of de facto parenthood because the Supreme Court found that “‘special
factors . . . might justify the State’s interference with [the biological mother’s] fundamen-
tal right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her [children],’” and because the
dissent in Troxel specifically noted that parental rights under the state statute depend on
whether the third party seeking visitation is a “complete stranger” or a de facto parent
(quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 100–01)).
211. See Mark C. Rahdert, In Search of a Conservative Vision of Constitutional Privacy: Two
Case Studies from the Rehnquist Court, 51 VILL. L. REV. 859, 876 (2006) (noting that Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Troxel “made no attempt to identify what sort of justification might
meet her ‘special factors’ test,” thus leaving the test “wide open, recognizing that the states
needed some maneuvering room to respond to rapid social changes in the structure of the
family”).
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lived with and helped raise because the law in Maryland as to whether
same-sex couples can legally adopt is “unsettled.”212  If unmarried
same-sex couples are unable to jointly adopt a child, and Maryland
does not recognize de facto parenthood, then the non-adoptive part-
ner, as a pure third party, must prove the higher standard, and is thus
more likely to lose all rights to the child upon dissolution of the
couple’s relationship.213  By recognizing the de facto parent doctrine
as a justified limitation on legal parents’ absolute right to the care,
custody, and control of their children, the court could protect gay and
lesbian parents’ tenuous rights.214
Recognizing de facto parents’ rights is prudent given the nature
of Maryland adoption law.  Under Maryland’s adoption statutes, any
adult may petition a court for adoption.215  If the petitioner is mar-
ried, the petitioner’s spouse may join in the petition unless the spouse
(1) is separated from the petitioner under circumstances that give the
petitioner grounds for annulment or divorce; (2) is not competent to
join in the petition; or (3) is a parent of the prospective adoptee and
has consented to the adoption.216  Under Section 1-207 of the Estates
and Trusts article of the Maryland Code, “[a]n adopted child shall be
treated as a natural child of his adopting parent or parents,” terminat-
ing the legal status of the natural parents as the child’s legal parent.217
Where the adopting parent is the spouse of the child’s natural parent,
however, the adoption does not terminate the natural parent’s
rights.218  Additionally, a child adopted more than once is considered
212. Janice M., 404 Md. at 696 n.1, 948 A.2d at 94 n.1.  Although the majority in Janice M.
explained that it was not expressing an opinion on the issue of same-sex couples’ right to
adopt in Maryland, the court nonetheless acknowledged that there is “no explicit legal or
statutory authority in Maryland for adoption” where a domestic partner seeks custody and/
or visitation of her former partner’s adopted child. Id. at 686, 948 A.2d at 88 (majority
opinion).
213. Id. at 664, 685, 948 A.2d at 74–75, 87 (holding that Maryland does not recognize de
facto parenthood and that de facto parents, like any third party, must show a heightened
standard of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances in seeking visitation of a child
over the objections of the child’s legal parent before the court can consider the best inter-
ests of the child); see infra notes 215–223 and accompanying text. R
214. See infra notes 223–225 and accompanying text. R
215. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-3A-29(a), 5-3B-13(b)(1) (West 2006).
216. Id. §§ 5-3B-13(b)(2)(i)–(iii).
217. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207(a) (West 2001).
218. Id.  Adoptions by the natural parent’s new spouse, which do not terminate the nat-
ural parent’s full legal rights, are generally known as “step-parent adoptions.”  Jason N.W.
Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption Is the Second-Best Option: The Case for Legislative Reform
as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the Face of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11
SCHOLAR 57, 63 (2008).
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a child of the most recent adopting parents and legally ceases to be a
child of the previous adopting parents.219
Although trial courts in Maryland have granted second-parent
adoptions, the state legislature has not permitted second-parent adop-
tions and no appellate court has ruled on the issue.220  Thus, because
Maryland law does not recognize same-sex marriage,221 and Maryland
adoption statutes preclude unmarried partners from jointly adopting
a child, same-sex couples’ parental rights are unresolved.222  Absent
second-parent adoption in Maryland, equitable legal theories includ-
ing recognition of de facto parenthood are the only measures availa-
ble to protect a same-sex parent’s right to visit his or her non-
biological, non-adopted child.223
De facto parent status is a particularly valuable limitation on legal
parents’ constitutional rights where second-parent adoption in Mary-
land is unsettled, given notions of the modern family and the increas-
ing number of same-sex couples deciding to raise children.224  With
advancing technology and evolving notions of what constitutes a fam-
ily, more children are forming parent-child relationships with non-
traditional parents.225  Recognition of de facto parent status thus
219. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207(b) (West 2001).
220. See Plowman, supra note 218, at 72 (citing Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Second- R
Parent Adoption in the U.S. (2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/issue_maps/2nd_parent_adoption_11_08.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2009)) (show-
ing which states, by statute and by common law, permit second-parent adoptions).  Like
step-parent adoptions, second-parent adoptions allow a child’s non-biological parent to
become a legal parent without terminating the legal parent’s rights. Id. at 59.
221. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2006) (“Only a marriage between a man
and a woman is valid in this State.”).
222. See supra notes 212, 215–219 and accompanying text. R
223. See Nicole Berner, Child Custody Disputes Between Lesbians: Legal Strategies and Their
Limitations, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 32–35 (1995) (discussing different strategies liti-
gators have used to protect parent-child relationships in lesbian families, including second-
parent adoption and equitable theories such as equitable estoppel, in loco parentis, and de
facto parenthood).  Alternatively, the Maryland General Assembly could amend Mary-
land’s adoption statutes so that the spousal exception to terminating a legal parent’s rights
also applies to same-sex partners. See Plowman, supra note 218, at 85 (noting that legisla- R
tion could amend adoption statutes’ reference to step-parent adoption to include
partners).
224. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 701, 948 A.2d 73, 96 (2008) (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (quoting E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999)); see also Plow-
man, supra note 218, at 59 (citing Lisa Bennett & Gary J. Gates, Human Rights Campaign, R
The Cost of Marriage Inequality to Children and Their Same-Sex Parents 3 (Apr. 13,
2004), http://www.hrc.org/documents/costkids.pdf) (noting that according to the 2000
census, 34.3% of lesbian couples and 22.3% of gay couples are raising children compared
to 45.6% of married, heterosexual couples and 43.1% of unmarried, heterosexual
couples).
225. Janice M., 404 Md. at 701–02, 948 A.2d at 97 (quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d 161, 165 (2005)).
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accords with the modern family and protects children from unneces-
sary separation from their nontraditional parents.226
D. Maryland Could Have Avoided Perpetuating its Detrimental
Adoption Regime by Following Other States in Recognizing that
a De Facto Parent Stands in Legal Parity with a Legal
Parent
If the Court of Appeals in Janice M. had found that de facto par-
ents stood in legal parity with biological or adoptive parents for pur-
poses of assessing custody and visitation rights, the law in Maryland
would be consistent with the more forward-looking common law of
several other states.227  In Janice M., Chief Judge Bell conceded that
226. Although this analysis focuses on protection of same-sex parental rights, recogni-
tion of the de facto parent doctrine protects classes of de facto parents other than same-sex
parents.  As Judge Raker argued in dissent in Janice M., Monroe v. Monroe also supports
recognition of the de facto parent doctrine in the context of mistaken paternity. Id. at
706–07, 948 A.2d at 100; Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 760–62, 621 A.2d 898, 899–900
(1993).  In holding that exceptional circumstances justified the court’s decision to grant
custody to a third party who mistakenly believed he was the natural father of a child, then-
Judge Bell noted in Monroe that, in custody disputes, the relationship between the child
and the third party is “[w]hat is important.” Monroe, 329 Md. at 775, 621 A.2d at 906.
Then-Judge Bell further explained that a child can become psychologically dependent on
a third party while the child maintains an “ongoing” relationship with his or her legal
parent, particularly when the parent fosters and facilitates the relationship between the
child and the third party. Id.  Thus, the de facto parent doctrine would also protect third
parties, including parents who have mistakenly treated their children as their own, from
unnecessary separation, which can harm both the de facto parent and the child. See Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98–99 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that relationships
between a third party and a child can “be so enduring that ‘in certain circumstances where
a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the
child of the relationship could cause severe psychological harm to the child’ . . . and harm
to the adult may also ensue” (quoting In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998))); see also
Mellisa Holtzman, The “Family Relations” Doctrine: Extending Supreme Court Precedent to Custody
Disputes Between Biological and Nonbiological Parents, 51 FAM. REL. 335, 340 (2002) (explain-
ing that a doctrine recognizing that, in custody disputes, the child should be placed in the
custody of the parent to whom the child is psychologically attached “goes a long way to-
ward protecting the interests of children and adults simultaneously . . . by preserving their
attachments to one another”).
227. See, e.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 888–90, 893 (holding that despite the lack of statu-
tory authority expressly permitting visitation privileges to third parties in a “parent-like
position,” a de facto parent seeking visitation only needed to show that such visitation was
in the best interests of the child); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541–42, 547–48, 554–55
(N.J. 2000) (finding jurisdiction in a case involving a woman seeking custody and visitation
of her former domestic partner’s biological child despite the lack of statutory authority
explicitly addressing whether unmarried domestic partners had standing to seek custody
and visitation of their former partners’ biological children, and holding that the woman
was the child’s “psychological parent,” stood in legal parity with the child’s biological
mother, and as such was entitled to visitation under a best interests standard); In re Parent-
age of L.B., 122 P.3d at 163, 169, 177 (holding that (1) even though a de facto parent
lacked standing to seek visitation rights under state statute, because the legislature was
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several other states had created third party visitation statutes that
grant de facto parents visitation rights over the objections of legal par-
ents, but argued that it was “within [the] prerogative” of the Maryland
General Assembly to adopt this approach.228  Yet several of these
other states created rights for de facto parents equal to those of legal
parents in visitation disputes in the absence of explicit statutory au-
thority.229  Thus, the Janice M. court failed to acknowledge that the
Court of Appeals may similarly approve de facto parent visitation with-
out explicit statutory authority to do so.
Moreover, the Janice M. court may have restricted the legislature
from adopting a statute granting de facto parents visitation by sug-
gesting that the statute may be unconstitutional.  As Chief Judge Bell
suggested, the court’s broad interpretation of Article 24 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights,230 Maryland’s counterpart to the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, may limit the Maryland
General Assembly.231  According to Chief Judge Bell, although Mary-
land courts read the United States Constitution and the Maryland
constitution in pari materia, they often interpret the Maryland constitu-
tion to better protect individual liberties.232  Thus, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland may now find a statute limiting parents’
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children
to be unconstitutional.  Although the court declined to express a view
as to the constitutionality of a state visitation statute granting de facto
parents visitation without showing parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances, the court’s more expansive protection of legal parents’
constitutional rights may have nonetheless closed the legislative door
on this issue.233
“conspicuously silent” on the rights of children in nontraditional families, de facto parents
stood in legal parity with biological or adoptive parents and had standing under the com-
mon law to seek the same rights and responsibilities as legal parents, and (2) the court may
award such rights based on the best interests of the child).
228. Janice M., 404 Md. at 686, 689, 948 A.2d at 88–89 (majority opinion) (citing
SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2007); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I.
2000)).
229. See supra note 227. R
230. MD. CONST. art. XXIV.
231. See Janice M., 404 Md. at 679–80 n.7, 948 A.2d at 83–84 n.7 (noting that the Mary-
land Court of Appeals has interpreted Article 24 more broadly than the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “‘in instances where fundamental fairness de-
manded that we do so’” (quoting Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 175, 786 A.2d 631, 681
(2001) (Raker, J., dissenting))).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 689, 948 A.2d at 89.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Janice M. v. Margaret K., the Court of Appeals of Maryland in-
validated the de facto parent doctrine and held that any third party
seeking custody or visitation over the objections of a legal parent must
prove parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.234  In applying
this heightened standard, the court failed to recognize that de facto
parents, unlike third parties, do not intrude on the rights of legal par-
ents to raise their children because the de facto parent test requires
that the legal parent consent to and foster the de facto parent-child
relationship.235  Accordingly, the court failed to distinguish cases in-
volving pure third parties from those involving de facto parents.236  In
applying a heightened standard to all third parties, which includes de
facto parents, the court also threatened same-sex couples’ right to
maintain relationships with their children where same-sex parent
adoption is unsettled in Maryland.237  Instead, the court should have
updated its law to grant special visitation rights to de facto parents
based on a more lenient standard. even without statutory authority.
Moreover, even if the legislature were to act, the court has suggested
that such legislation may be unconstitutional.238  Although the court
argued that a higher standard for granting de facto parent visitation
protects the rights of legal parents, a more flexible approach would
have better recognized modern notions of family without jeopardizing
the right of parents to the care, custody, and control of their children.
234. Id. at 664, 685, 948 A.2d at 74–75, 87.
235. See supra Part IV.A.
236. See supra Part IV.B.
237. See supra Part IV.C.
238. See supra Part IV.D.
